Evolutionary game theory has shown that in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation punishment may be an adaptive behaviour. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this nding but yields contradictory results on the cooperation-enhancing eect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. The present study sets out to examine the question of whether cooperation will still be part of an evolutionary stable strategy if we allow for counterpunishment opportunities in a theoretic model and tries to reconcile the seemingly contradictory ndings from the laboratory. We nd that the apparent contradictions can be explained by a dierence in the number of retaliation stages employed (one vs many) and even small dierences in the degree of retaliativeness.
Introduction
Recent laboratory experiments have cast serious doubt on the external validity of earlier ndings suggesting that punishment is a suitable solution for social-dilemma situations. Not only may there be some scepticism regarding the welfare eects of punishment, as the discussion coming to a head in Dreber et al. (2008) and nding its preliminary end in the study of Gächter et al. (2008) shows, but the very cooperation-enhancing eect seems to be challenged: by re-1 INTRODUCTION the cooperative outcome of earlier studies are to changes in the experimental setup. While the exogenous restriction to a single stage of punishment does not seem to be plausible in most real-world situations, existing (evolutionary) models of cooperation have comfortably rested on this assumption. The present paper makes a rst step in addressing the challenge posed by the experimental results mentioned, incorporating the issue of counterpunishment in an evolutionary model of cooperation. More specically, we set out to provide an answer to the question of whether strong reciprocity with its disposition to punish noncooperators may still be part of the outcome of an evolutionary process when some (defecting) players engage in retaliative action. At the same time, our model illustrates a plausible explanation for the`resurrection' of cooperation in subsequent studies of punishment and counterpunishment, such as Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008) or Nicklisch and Wol (2009) . We show that both the number of retaliation stages and the degree of players' retaliativeness may play a critical role in determining the outcome. The task of explaining the emergence of retaliation, however, is left to future studies.
Evolutionary models of cooperation and strong reciprocity. Cooperation is a central aspect of human societies which researchers from many dierent elds are still paying attention to (e.g. Hauert et al., 2007 , de Quervain et al., 2004 , or Herrmann et al., 2008 . One avenue of research followed by scholars from elds as diverse as anthropology, biology, and economics is the study of evolutionary models to obtain a better understanding of how the large amount of cooperation observed in today's societies (observable e.g.
in the preparation of a coordinated political response to the nancial crisis of 2008) may have developed. A lot of work amongst students of the evolution of cooperation has been devoted to aspects such as kinship (Hamilton, 1964) , reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) , costly signaling (Zahavi, 1975 , Gintis et al., 2001 , indirect reciprocity and reputation (Alexander, 1979 and 1987 , Nowak and Sigmund, 1998 ),`culture' (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981 , Boyd and Richerson, 1985 , norms (Sugden, 1986 , Sethi, 1996 , group selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998) , and strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000 .
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This last concept of strong reciprocity has received a lot of attention, as it is unique among the mentioned theoretical solution in that it would predict cooperative behaviour in the artefactual world of an anonymous laboratory setting without repeated interaction between the same players.
2 In light of the fact that we observe a substantial degree of cooperation in these situations, the concept of 1 The studies mentioned are only meant to indicate important early contributions. For more detailed picture of the literature, the interested reader is kindly referred e.g. to the works collected in Hammerstein (2003) .
2 I am indebted to Nikos Nikiforakis for the comment that other social norms may also account for this nding. While this is true, these other norms would typically require a suciently accurate pre-play recognition of the other player's type to survive in an evolutionary context (cf. Sethi, 1996) . In the laboratory, however, this would seem to be a rather strong assumption.
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strong reciprocity seems to be worth a closer look. The rst thing to note is that the concept may have dierent readings, as the discussion triggered by Fehr and Henrich (2003) shows (cf. Stephens, 2005 or McKenzie Alexander, 2005 . The general idea, however, is that of a behavioral disposition to sacrice resources to bestow benets on those who have bestowed benets and to sacrice resources to punish those who are not bestowing benets in accordance with some social norm.
3 In a prisoner's dilemma or a public-good game like the ones used in the aforementioned models on the evolution of cooperation, this translates into a cooperative action in settings without repeated interaction as well as with repeated interation, unless in the latter case if the other player(s) is (are) in bad standing. On the other hand, strong reciprocity stipulates the punishment of defectors whenever there are punishment stages and regardless of players' anonymity.
While it has been shown that unconditional cooperation cannot easily be stabilised in such settings, costly punishment can be evolutionary stable and thus support cooperation in societies even when there is no inter-group conict (Henrich and Boyd, 2001 , Bowles and Gintis, 2004 , Carpenter et al., 2004 , Carpenter, 2007 . The intuition for this nding is rather straightforward: the payo dierence between an unconditional cooperator and a free-rider in the absence of punishers will always be positive, no matter what the type distribution in the society is. On the other hand, the payo dierence between a free-rider and a punisher may be negative if the fraction of punishers is large enough. Once free-riders are driven out of society, the payo dierence between punishers and pure cooperators goes to zero, such that punishers can survive and act as society's insurance against an invasion by free-riders. Recent contributions have gone on to show that punishing cooperators can even invade a non-cooperative society under certain conditions (Fowler, 2005 , Hauert et al., 2007 . This may happen if the public good is not an ideal-type public good, in the sense that people may opt out of the provision-and-benet process completely, and doing so, earn a higher payo than those participating in the public good under omnilateral defection. In that case, non-participants can take over a society of free-riders, being succeeded by either punishers or pure cooperators. Punishers will eventually be taken over by pure cooperators by neutral drift, who will subsequently be invaded by free-riders. Then, the cycle starts all over again.
However, over time, society will spend most of the time in a cooperative state, given the transition between pure cooperators and punishers will often take a long time.
Experimental studies. Social dilemmas like those employed by the above studies are characterised by the fact that each player has a dominant strategy of deviating from the socially optimal choice in favour of the player's individual gain, and, if a punishment stage exists, of not spending any resources on punishment.
While the standard game-theoretic solution of the dilemma is obvious, it is a priori far from clear whether this prediction corresponds to empirical observations or not, given real players' behaviour may be driven by other motivations apart from their individual material gain such as strong reciprocity. One important source of empirical evidence to address this question is the experimental economics literature, as in comparison to the eld, controlled laboratory experiments are not as prone to dierent interpretations of observed behaviour.
Therefore, experiments suggest themselves as a suitable backdrop against which results from the evolutionary literature can be examined.
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As in evolutionary models, in public-good experiments without features that go beyond the simultaneous decision problem of how much to contribute to the public good (translating into`all' or`nothing' in the prisoner's-dilemma case) and without information on the other players, cooperation cannot be sustained over long rounds.
5 In contrast, Yamagishi (1986) and Gächter (2000, 2002) were able to show that punishment was very eective in inducing cooperation in public-good games.
6 This result has been replicated e.g. by Nikiforakis (2008) and Denant-Boemont et al. (2007; henceforth, dnm) . However, both latter studies go on to show that this nding is valid only when punishment is restricted to a single punishment stage following the contribution stage. If (only) punished players can hit back, counterpunishment seems to eliminate the contribution-enhancing eect of single-stage punishment. dnm go on to show that for a second punishment stage without restrictions on punishment behaviour, cooperation is still reduced when compared to the single-stage punishment case, albeit not as much as in the counterpunishment-only situation. Adding further punishment stages leads to contradicting results: while in the study by Denant-Boemont et al., the level of cooperation is as low as in the treatment with two punishment stages, Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008, henceforth ne) observe a cooperation level that is as high as in the traditional single-punishment-stage design. Nicklisch and Wol (2009, nw) , focusing on a dierent question, only run a multiple-stage-punishment treatment, nding stable, non-decreasing average contributions at around half the endowment.
Previous studies and our model. Three important dierences in the experimental setup come to mind that may account for the dierent ndings:
(i) the studies employed dierent punishment technologies: dnm and nw use the technology employed in Fehr and Gächter (2000) , while ne make use of a linear 1 : 2 punishment technology similar to the linear 1 : 3 technology in Fehr and Gächter (2002) , 7 4 This approach is not new: for other examples, cf. e.g. the studies by Gintis et al. (2003) , Carpenter et al. (2004 ), or Carpenter (2007 .
5 Cf. the extensive survey in Ledyard (1995) , or the summary of the core facts in Ostrom (2000, p. 140 (Henrich and Boyd, 2001 ). However, the experimental counterpunishment studies show that retaliation is a force to factor in, whereas evidence for second-order punishment is rather weak (e.g., Nicklisch and Wol, 2009 ).
Hence, the question to be answered is whether we can really abstract from retaliation when explaining cooperation by punishment. More specically, would strong reciprocity with its disposition to punish non-cooperators still be part of an evolutionary stable outcome when some (defecting) players engage in counterpunishment? identify the main reasons for the stabilisation of cooperation through punishment to work in the classical evolutionary models:
(I) punishers don't have to pay the costs of punishing very often if being punished is more costly than the costs associated with sticking to the norm (...) punishers need only punish occasional deviants;
(II) the cost of punishing is small (and probably ambiguous), so conformist increase in the punishment-eciency parameter from 1 : 2 to 1 : 3 would lead to an increasing trend in average contributions for multiple punishment stages as it does in the case without counterpunishment, cf. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) . While such a shift could make enforcement more eective, it would also render backlashing defectors a more dire threat.
8 An important consequence of this dierence is that, in dnm, punishment could be delayed strategically until the nal punishment stage to forego retaliation.
9 Carpenter et al. (2004, p. 409) , addition by this author.
5 transmission can overcome it, and keep a strategy of punishing stable in the social group; 10 and (III) when punishing norm violators is common, everyone tends to adhere to the norm because the costs of being punished for violating the norm exceed the costs of sticking with the norm.
While introducing retaliation opportunities will leave (I) and (III) unaected, the cost of punishing will increase when some of the punished strike back.
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Hence, one would conjecture the disadvantage to be overcome by conformist transmission or intergroup conict will increase. Indeed, we nd the retaliation frequency determines the set of initial type-distributions attaining the cooperative outcome. However, we show that the introduction of retaliation possibilities may act in either direction: for high frequencies of counterpunishment, the basin of attraction of the punishment xed point decreases as expected, while it is expanded for low such frequencies. This is due to the attenuation of actual payo dierences by an aggravation of the worst-case scenario, against which any payo dierences are evaluated.
For the purpose of our paper, we shortly introduce a baseline model without counterpunishment opportunities as our benchmark in section 2 and discuss its main properties before we proceed to introduce retaliation in section 3. In this section, we will contrast the results of our model for low respectively high counterpunishment frequencies to the benchmark case and subsequently address the question of whether a cooperative society and positive retaliativeness levels are mutually exclusive. In section 4, we discuss our ndings relating them to the experimental ndings that provided an essential part of the motivation for undertaking the present study, as well as to the results of existing evolutionary models of cooperation. We conclude in section 5.
The baseline model
In our basic assumptions, we will closely follow the model presented by Henrich and Boyd (2001) and modied in Boyd et al. (2003) . 6 shot game consisting of two stages. In stage 0, the contribution stage, agents play a symmetric N -person binary public-good game. A cooperating player incurs a cost of c to convey a benet of b/N to every member of the group, where b/N < c < b, while a defecting player does not incur any cost nor convey any benet. In the second stage, players may punish each other, incurring a cost of k/N and inducing a damage of p/N for the player punished. We assume there are three types of agents: (i) defectors who do not contribute to the public good, (ii) cooperators who contribute c unless they make a mistake with an error probability e, and (iii) punishers (strong reciprocators) who behave as cooperators in stage 0 and punish non-contributors unless they make a mistake with the same error probability e. This assymmetric treatment regarding the proneness to errors was introduced by Henrich and Boyd (2001) , the intuition being that players do not erroneously exert an eort (given they have already chosen not to) but may well fail to do so, be it for external reasons or forgetfulness. While from our point of view it is plausible to assume defectors do not cooperate by chance, non-punishers could well be expected to erroneously punish with a certain probability think of an untargeted, casual remark that is perceived as a chastisement for a non-cooperative behaviour the speaker might not even have been aware of. We abstract from this for simplicity, and for better comparability with Henrich and Boyd's results. We also abstract from errors of perception, for the same reasons.
Denoting the fraction of defectors, cooperators and punishers by π D , π C , and π P , respectively, and omitting the benet-term for ease of exposition, we have the following expected payos B i : 12
Having established the basic game, we now proceed to derive the replicator dynamics for this case.
Replicator dynamics of the baseline game
To derive the dynamics, we assume that after playing the game, agents reproduce asexually and die. Their ospring rst takes on the parent's type, but additionally gets to know a random type's average payo and frequency of occurrence from the recent round. Alternatively, we may interpret the situation as agents running into another agent every certain time period and reconsidering their type. With probabilites α and (1 − α) an agent chooses a learning rule, comparing either the frequency of the other agent's type, π j , to their own, π i , or 12 We can omit the public-good benet in the payo equations without loss of generality because this term is the same for all players and for a type's tness (or attractiveness, in our interpretation of the model), only payo dierences are relevant.
7 expected payos B j versus B i . Then, we take the probability of a type-switch to be equal to
where β is the inverted largest-possible payo dierence between player types and thus normalises payo dierences to lie within the intervall [−1; 1], while prob(j|i, j) is the probability that an agent of type i turns into a j-type given they meet.
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While it is not our purpose to enter into an extensive discussion on whether a conformist learning rule like the one our agents perform in α * 100 percent of the cases is a suitable description of human behavior, a few words seem warranted. are not capable of doing so generally receiving information on the payos from some sort of agency, (1 − α) can be interpreted as the probability with which the agent has this information. In case the agent does not, it seems plausible to use frequencies (which may be easier to obtain) as the best information available on a strategy's tness; nally, (iv) Andrés Guzmán et al. (2007) show that a conformist learning rule may not only enhance cooperation but increase the tness of groups and thus be adaptive in environments characterised by cooperative dilemmas and (however rare) intergroup conict.
18 As our focus does not lie on the question of which learning-rules are going to be employed 13 Equation (2) assumes that, if neither payos nor frequencies dier between the types, the individual will acquire either type with probability 0.5. In other words, there is no status-quo bias towards his inherited (or past) type. We admit that this will be a strong assumption in many contexts; we nevertheless follow Henrich and Boyd (2001) in this respect, as it renders the model easier to handle and more traceable. We conjecture that a deviation from this assumption would not change the qualitative results but merely slow down the model dynamics.
14 For a more thorough discussion of this issue, cf. e.g. . 15 Ibd.; also, cf. Zafar (2009). 16 Zafar (2009, p. 1) ; in an public-good experiment with public-account payos going to a well-known charity, he nds that conformism plays an important role in subject behaviour.
17 Cf. e.g. Henrich and McElreath (2003) , or Richerson and Boyd (2005) .
18 Note that in their case agents do not mix learning rules they are either payo-oriented or conformist learners. In our case, this would lead to six dierent types in the basic model and twelve in the retaliation model, increasing the model complexity beyond reasonable limits.
8 by the agents, we abstract from this issue and rely on the results of the earlier studies mentioned, simply assuming agents are at least to a small extend driven by a conformist bias.
With the given average payos and switching probabilities we can now proceed to calculate the expected period-to-period change in type frequencies for any given type distribution.
19 Doing so, we obtain the following dierence equations describing the expected fraction change:
for all i, j ∈ {P, C, D}. Note that equation (3) holds for any number of strategies:
for two strategies, it boils down to the replicator dynamics used by Henrich and
Boyd (2001), while we will make use of the three-and six-strategy versions for our baseline and retaliation models, respectively. Furthermore, in contrast to the standard replicator dynamics as introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) ,
for the evolutionary-stability analysis it is generally not irrelevant whether we think of a mix of invading types or the corresponding mixed-strategy invader.
For our replicator dynamics this only holds for π i suciently close to one: in that case we can set π i − Σ j =i
To ensure evolutionary stability of a pure strategy, it is then sucient to require that α >
which is equivalent to requiring the conformist bias to be strong enough to outweigh the normalised payo disadvantage i−type players face when paired with an optimally mixing player.
Out of the three trivial xed points in the baseline model, P = (π P = 1, π C = 0, π D = 0), C = (0, 1, 0), and D = (0, 0, 1), D is evolutionary stable (ES, i.e. defection is an evolutionary stable strategy, or ESS) always, while P is ES only for αs that exceed a minimum of
Before we go on examining the remaining xed points in terms of evolutionary stability, let us look at the implications of equation (4) In taking expected values, we abstract from stochastic inuences, once again for reasons of comparability and simplicity. We also stick to the discrete-time modelling for similar reasons, and because it is closer to the experimental data.
20 From this argument, we see that comparing dierent group sizes N does not have an inuence on our results only if we assume punishers adjust their per-defector punishment expenditures κ(N ) = k/N . What c > (1 − e)p describes, then, is the case when the number of 9 is a viable option in the vast majority of studies on punishment in public-good settings, notable exceptions being Decker et al. (2003) and treatments in Egas and Riedl (2008) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) , who explicitly address the question of a very inecient punishment technology.
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Proceeding with our stability analysis, we nd that C will be ES only for unrealistically high αs (α = c/(2c + k) 1/3). Apart from the trivial xed points P, C, and D, there are two mixes of two strategies each (P and D, and P and C, respectively), plus, for certain values of alpha, an additional fully mixed xed point.
22 None of them is stable, however, which follows directly from the stability of the trivial solutions.
In summary, we replicate the main result from Henrich and Boyd (2001) 
26
players is not large enough to make the expenditureκ s.t. c = (1 − e)τκN aordable, where τ is the (1 : τ ) punishment technology's eciency parameter.
21 I am grateful to Nikos Nikiforakis for pointing me to the latter two studies. 22 Unfortunately, this equilibrium cannot easily be derived analytically, as the corresponding quadratic equations have no solution in R under most parameter combinations, apart from being too complex for any meaningful interpretation. We therefore had to resort to a numerical analysis to obtain this result.
23 Henrich and Boyd obtain the result for even smaller conformist biases, as their result rests on an n th -order punishment argument.
24 Note that these are not the basins of attraction: in the blue case for low contribution costs (c = 2), for example, the basin of attraction of P is but an ε-environment of P .
25 This technology has also been employed by evolutionary studies, such as Hauert et al. (2007) . Other studies like Carpenter (2007) or Dreber et al. (2008) provide their agents with more powerful punishment technologies. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we stick to the widely used 1:3 technology, as this gives us a more conservative estimate of whether and under what conditions P can be stabilised.
26 Increasing the error parameter to e = 0.1 does not change the qualitative results. The same holds true for changing the number of players within a group. What may result is a shift between the situation in which contributions are enforceable and when they are not, cf.
footnote 20. The eects of a deterioration of monitoring possibilities that may go hand in hand with an increase in group sizes are studied in Carpenter (2007) .
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Under the given parameters for P to be evolutionary stable, the conformist bias need not be larger thanα base ≈ 0.0033, for contribution costs such that being a punisher means investing an equivalent of one sixth of the contribution costs in a non-contributor's punishment (the left case in gures 1 and 2). On the other hand, for contribution costs such that the ratio of per-defector punishment costs and contribution costs is one tenth (corresponding to the right hand sides in gures 1 and 2), the conformist bias needs to be as large asα base ≈ 0.054. Even though a fraction of conformist learning of 5.4 percent does not seem unthinkable, these numbers illustrate an important point: the fraction of conformist learning necessary to stabilise punishment is highly sensitive to changes in the costs of contribution. More specically, from equation (4) we obtain δα δc < 0 for c < (1 − e)p, given P has to be stabilised against invading cooperators, whereas δα δc > 0 for c > (1 − e)p, as in this case, it is the defectors who are most likely to invade a punishing society. However, the sensitivity ofα to changes in c is not symmetric: while the critical conformist bias hardly changes when enforcement is possible, c < (1 − e)p, it increases more than proportionally with contribution costs for a wide range of parameters under c > (1 − e)p. The mixture plots in gure 1 further illustrate two points: (i) a higher conformist bias makes it easier for punishers to survive as a group (which we already know from our derivation ofα base ), and (ii) for high contribution costs c, a punishing society will be invaded by defectors directly, whereas for a modest c (i.e. a lower c -to-p ratio), it will be invaded by cooperators rst and only then be taken over by defectors: on the low-c graph, a small step away from P on the P C-line carries society away from the punishing xed point while defectors are still absent, whereas a small step on P D is reverted; and vice versa for the high-c case. As discussed above, this is reected in the equation determining the minimum-required conformist bias for P to be ES (equation (4)). Figure 2 shows the dynamics for a fraction of conformist learning of α = 0.2. but also the basin of attraction of the xed point P is substantially larger than for higher such costs. What follows is that it is far more likely to end up in a cooperating steady state if contribution costs are low relative to the eect of punishment, another nding that is in line with what we would expect, given the payo dierences between defectors and the other types emanating from the rst two stages are smaller in this case.
In the next section, we will present our extension to the baseline game introducing retaliative stages. We then proceed to discuss how the dynamics change for dierent initial levels of retaliativeness and what this may tell us about the likelihood of dierent outcomes in varying environments.
The retaliation game
The retaliation game is like the baseline game with n additional punishment stages. Behaviour on these stages is guided by a`gene' (in our alternative interpretation, a behavioural rule) that controls players' retaliativeness. Given the gene may have dierent consequences for dierent player types, paying attention to it means increasing the number of player types to six -a retaliative and an accommodating, tolerant variant of each player type introduced in the baseline model. Let π i,r (π i,a ) denote the fraction of i-type players with(out) a disposition to hit back in case of being punished, while π i will still denote the total fraction of that type, i.e. π i = π i,r + π i,a . Applying the same logic as before, a retaliator may make a mistake in exerting punitive eort with probability e. Evolution will proceed according to the same principles as the types in the baseline model do.
Let us rst analyse how the additional stages aect the payos of the accommodating types. As these types do not get caught up in battles of punishment and counterpunishment, it is obvious that the expected payo of accommodating defectors and cooperators, B D,a and B C,a , is equal to that of the corresponding baseline-model types, B D and B C from equation (1), respectively. Only the 12 payo of tolerant punishers will undergo a slight change, as they will now face counterpunishment actions by punished retaliators:
On the other hand, retaliative behaviour gives rise to costs that depend on the number of additional punishment stages n. In our evolutionary-stability analysis, we will contrast two scenarios: the baseline model (n = 0) and the general case in which we have n = R additional punishment stages. While the former scenario corresponds to the setup of Fehr and Gächter (2002) for n = 4. Larger numbers of n may be thought of as corresponding to the case of an endogenous number of retaliation stages as in Nicklisch and Wol (2009) or Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008). 27 The additional payos from n = R, R ≥ 2, retaliation stages are given bŷ
The additional payo of a defector from retaliation,B D,r , is the expected cost of punishing back a non-retaliating punisher, −(1 − e) 2 π P,a k, plus the expected cost of alternating counterpunishment against and being retaliated against by a retaliating punisher, where the probability of later stages diminishes due to the error probability e. A retaliating cooperator and a retaliating punisher face 27 The largest number of endogenous punishment stages observed in the study of Nicklisch and Wol (2009) was eight, followed by one observation with six. These eight (six) punishment stages boil down to one punishment plus three (two) retaliation stages if we discount rounds due to follow-up punishment actions directed at the same player as a punishment action on the directly preceding stage. Note that in the study discussed, and unlike in Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) , this cannot be explained by subjects trying to save on costs by spreading their punishment actions over various punishment stages.
13 the same additional costs as the retaliating defector whenever they mistakenly defect, and the punisher faces additional costs from counterpunishing those who retaliated against his or her rst-order punishment, as well as the ensuing feud.
Together with the corresponding replicator dynamics equation (3) which we already know from our treatment of the baseline model, we now proceed to analyse the changes that result for our dynamic system as a whole under the dierent scenarios.
Each baseline-model xed point corresponds to two dierent xed points in the retaliation model, one for the retaliating and one for the accommodating variant of each type. Bearing in mind the general question we set out to answer, that of whether a cooperative outcome can be stabilised in the presence of retaliation opportunities, we have four candidate xed points to consider: 28 1. accommodating punishers. First, it is easy to see that for the accommodating variant of the punisher type to be an ESS, the requirements on the conformist bias α will be less strong than for retaliating punishment, given B P,r ≤ B P,a + eB D,r andB D,r | π P >0 < 0. Furthermore, an analogous argument shows there will not be any retaliation by the optimally mixing invasion candidate. But then, we are faced with the same situation as in the baseline model. Hence, we directly obtain
is the absolute value of the largest possible payo dierence divided by (1 − e), there are n = R retaliation stages, and
We see thatB = −1
1−e B P,r | π D,r =1 for odd numbers of retaliation stages and sensible values of the error rate e, as well as for a large range of parameter 28 Obviously, both variants of the defecting type remain an ESS in the retaliation model for any strictly positive conformist bias. The latter is needed for the type in question to be stable against invasion by neutral drift by its also defecting counterpart. 14 values for an even number of retaliation stages including those we usually see in economic experiments.
29 We therefore focus our attention on this case. Note that the dierence between equations (4) and (5) is merely in the largest possible payo dierence in the game, −(1−e)B, the reciprocal of the payo-normalising parameter β. Comparing equations (4) and (5), we directly see that for any number of additional retaliation stages n, B(n) > c + k =B(0) ≡B base will always hold, so that it will always require a lower conformist bias for accommodating punishers to be an ESS than for punishers in the baseline model. In other words, the introduction of retaliation opportunities may enhance the stabilisation of punishment.
Furthermore, it is easy to show thatα P,a (n + 1) <α P,a (n) always holds, such that a further increase in retaliation stages always leads to a higher likelihood of a cooperative outcome if punishers abstain from retaliation.
2. retaliating punishers. We already established that a player type setting out to invade a society consisting exclusively of punishers will not play a retaliating strategy with positive probability, given the debilitating eect on any individual within the majority will be very weak compared to the impact such behaviour will have on the invader's tness. Since B P,a < B C,a holds for any distribution of types π, an optimally mixing invader will never include accommodating punishment in the support, either. From there, following a similar argument as in the baseline model we can directly derive the critical value of the conformist bias, (5) and (6) yields a conrmation of something we already know, namely that it is much easier to stabilise accommodating punishment than to stabilise the retaliating variant.
30 What will be the eect of introducing retaliation opportunities compared to the baseline scenario? We already know that the payo-normalising parameter β decreases for n > 0, which we have seen to facilitate the stabilisation of punishment. Nevertheless, a comparison of (4) and (6) coupled with some straightforward algebra shows that, for any number of stages n, n > 0, we obtainα base P <α P,r (n). In other words, it needs a stronger conformist bias to ensure evolutionary stability of punishers in an environment where retaliation is possible if the punishers make use of that possibility. At the same time,α P,r (n) is not necessarily a monotonous function of n:
29 Cf. footnote 27; even for R = 7 and with k : p = 1 : 3, we obtain a condition that is roughly equivalent to c > (1/3)p + 2ep, which is fullled for moderate error rates and a c-to-p ratio as in most experiments.
30 To see that, note that the dierence betweenα P,a andα P,r is simply that the same positive number is added to both the enumerator and the denominator of 5 to obtain 6. 15 while for c < (1 − e)p, an even number of retaliation stages will always lead to a higher critical value of α than the next-lower odd number, the converse does not always hold and is highly dependent on the chosen parameters. For our parametrisation, we haveα P,r (n+1) >α P,r (n), ∀n < 4, but the opposite holds for all n such that n > 3 and 1 E (n ) = 1. For c > (1 − e)p, no general statements can be made, as the result crucially depends on the c-to-p ratio. For the parameters used in this paper, thê α P,r (n + 1) >α P,r (n), ∀n < 3, andα P,r (n + 1) <α P,r (n), otherwise.
3. accommodating pure cooperators. In an environment without punishers, retaliators will always have the same payo as non-retaliatiors. In the absence of any conformist bias, accommodating pure cooperators will be invaded by their retaliating counterpart by neutral drift. However, this will be prevented by any strictly positive conformist bias. Furthermore, it is easy to see that in this environment, an invading punisher of any variant will always have a lower expected payo than a cooperator, such that, if accommodating pure cooperators are to be invaded, this will have to be done by any of the defector types. Analogously to the baseline model, we directly obtainα
Comparing equation (7) to equation (6), we see that, for suciently small values of the error frequency e, a reasonable number of retaliation stages R, and a wide range of parameter combinations (c, k, p) it will be easier to stabilise retaliating punishers than accommodating pure cooperators.
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Nevertheless, the a-priori relationship betweenα C,a andα P,r is unclear.
Having as little as ve retaliation stages, an error rate of e = 0.15 and a c-to-p ratio of 2 : 3 is enough to make the stabilisation of accommodating cooperators easier than that of retaliating punishers (α C,a = 0.167 vs. α P,r = 0.170). 32 For pure cooperators, we replicate a nding we already stated for the case of accommodating punishers: the higher the number of additional retaliation stages, the lower the requirement on the conformist bias for pure cooperation to be ES.
4. retaliating pure cooperators. For this group, the same holds as for accommodating pure cooperators, except for the fact that punishers invading in low numbers will obtain even lower payos than against the accommodating variant. Consequently,α C,r =α C,a will hold, whereα C,a is dened by equation (7).
Before we summarise the ndings from our analysis and highlight some possible eects, let me shortly comment on the dierence between the baseline and the retaliation models driving many of our above results. As we pointed out, the dierence between equations (5) and (7), on the one hand, and (4), on the other, is merely in the largest possible payo dierence in the game, (1 − e)B, which is 31 Cf. footnote 27.
32 For comparison, under the same setting,α P,a = 0.015.
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the reciprocal of the payo-normalising parameter β. This payo dierence may be interpreted as the reference intervall against which the types' actual payo dierences are evaluated. In a retaliative world, the largest potential payo dierence increases, as punishers may now face retaliative actions additionally to their own contribution and punishment expenses. Because of that, the types' normalised payo dierences become relatively smaller, and therefore, the payo disadvantage faced by punishers to be outweighed by a conformist bias is relativised. In a sense, the nding that a cooperative outcome becomes more likely in a world where retaliation is an option but all players abstain from it bears a vague resemblance to the results from gift-exchange experiments that principals may do best not using their stick in a punishment world (cf. Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003) .
Turning to the main results in terms of our analysis of evolutionary stability, we can state the following:
Result 2. As expected, retaliating punishers require a higher conformist bias to be ESS than their accommodating counterpart. For pure cooperators and defectors, the variant does not play a role in terms of the respective xed point's evolutionary stability. Result 4. Compared to punishment in the baseline game, for retaliating punishment to be ES a higher conformist bias is needed. The relationship between the critical value of α and the number of retaliation stages is non-monotonic and highly dependent on the c-to-p ratio.
Result 5. In many cases, the conformist bias needed to make retaliating punishment an ESS will be lower than that to stabilise pure cooperation. However, this need not always be the case.
Having talked about the evolutionary stability of the dierent player-types and having established the corresponding requirements on the conformist bias, we now want to illustrate a possible scenario that may come out of our dynamic system. For this illustrative purpose, we choose initial fractions of punishers that may seem excessively large when compared to common type distributions in the typical subject pool (Fischbacher et al., 2001 , or Herrmann et al., 2008 . Note however, that in public-goods experiments it is typically the fraction of cooperative matching groups determining the development of average contributions, rather than e.g. the contribution level of the least cooperative matching group.
Hence, our focus on groups who a priori feature a greater disposition towards a cooperative outcome does not seem completely unwarranted per se. Whether the chosen type-distribution is excessively high even under these premises is a question we do not purport to answer empirically as our aim at this point merely is to illustrate possible patterns. Gächter (2000, 2002) and of counterpunishment studies like Nikiforakis (2008) . We further put our results into the context of earlier evolutionary models of cooperation based on punishment before concluding in section 5. In that section, we shortly recapitulate our results and address the two main questions of this paper: (i) can we still explain cooperation by refering to punishment mechanisms if we accept that counterpunishment cannot be excluded, and (ii) if we can, will retaliation have to play a role in future models of cooperation?
33 The numbers of stages were chosen as to reect the experimental setups of Nikiforakis (2008) and Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) . Similar type-evolution patterns can be found for other values of n, α, and e. Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2008, ne) introduce an endogenous number of punishment stages and observe a cooperation level that is as high as in a treatment without opportunities for retaliation, which contrasts with the earlier ndings of dnm. 34 In our view, the most likely explanation for these discrepancies is a subject-pool dierence. As has been illustrated in gure 4, dierences in players' retaliativeness may account for a shift in the expected outcome from cooperation to defection and vice versa.
A possible reading of our results could see the elimination of the positive eects of punishment observed in the earlier counterpunishment studies stem from so-34 The reported ndings by dnm and ne were obtained using a partner-matching with changing IDs; Nicklisch and Wol (2009) nd cooperation-levels similar to those of ne for a strangermatching.
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ciety consisting of suciently retaliative individuals, while the subjects used by the latter studies may have been more tolerant (`accommodating'). This difference in the subject pools' average responsiveness to punishment need not be large if the initial type distribution is close enough to the corresponding border of attraction.
With respect to the evolutionary literature, our result 1 discussed above conrms the results of earlier models without counterpunishment opportunities, such as Henrich and Boyd (2001) or Boyd et al. (2003) . Incorporating retaliation, we nd that the level of conformist learning required to make punishment an evolutionary stable strategy is higher compared to the model without counterpunishment if players' retaliativeness is high (result 4), but lower if retaliators are rare (result 3). Under the latter scenario, a purely cooperative strategy is also more likely to be stabilised than in the baseline model (results 2 and 3). A higher number of retaliation stages plays a facilitating role for the stability of purely cooperative strategies as well as accommodating punishment, due to the worsened threat by the consequences of a battle of punishment and counterpunishment. Finally, we have seen that for some parameters it may be harder to stabilise retaliative punishment than pure cooperation (result 5).
Conclusion
One of the explanations considered most often for the puzzle of the high degree of human cooperation has been the existence of punishment opportunities in conjunction with the presence of strong reciprocators. In fact, this seems to be the focal explanation for cooperation in experimental work on social-dilemmas with no repeated interaction between the same subjects under an anonymous setting. However, recent laboratory studies like Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) allowed for retaliative punishment, casting serious doubt on the hypothesis' explanatory power. While the cooperation-adverse results of Nikiforakis (2008) seem to hinge on the restriction to a single, retaliationonly stage, it remains unclear whether in a multiple-punishment-stage setting cooperation can be restored to its full degree. Experimental studies have led to contradictory ndings on the question of whether the high degree of cooperation among humans can still be explained by the possibility to punish defecting society members (e.g., Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2008) , or whether this is a rather unlikely explanation (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007) . To our knowledge, the present study is the rst to address this question theoretically, using an evolutionary model of cooperation with multiple punishment and counterpunishment stages. We nd that our model can account for the breakdown of cooperation under a single retaliation stage as well as for its`restoration' under multiple retaliation stages. Furthermore, our results suggest that the degree of`restoration' crucially depends on the population's retaliativeness level, suggesting that the contradictory laboratory ndings could easily be explained by hardly noticeable subject-pool dierences.
From a theoretic perspective, our ndings suggest that not to account for retaliation may not be an overly restrictive assumption when explaining cooper-20 ation as a phenomenon: counterpunishment may change a society's probability of attaining a cooperative outcome, it may do so for both better and worse; at the same time, it generally does not render the punishing xed point unattainable, unless the level of conformist learning is very low. Therefore, if a conformist bias is a sensible descriptor of a part of social learning processes, the introduction of counterpunishment opportunities does not change the qualitative results of a punishment model of cooperation. In other words, if conformist learning is a non-negligible part of reality, abstracting from retaliation in models of cooperation induced by punishment may seem a sensible assumption to make as long as we do not want to make quantitative predictions about the probability of a cooperative outcome.
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